Punishment for using arms, etc
Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 deals with punishment for using arms, etc. Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. The Act came into force on 01 Oct 1962.
1[27. Punishment for using arms, etc.--(1) Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition in contravention of section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or does any act in contravention of section 7 and such use or act results in the death of any other person, 2[shall be punishable with imprisonment for life, or death and shall also be liable to fine.]
Section 27, The Arms Act, 1959 (Act 54 of 1959).
Cross-references
Extracted from the operative text of the enactments themselves. Every destination below exists in our corpus.
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh v. State of Bihar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Judgement of Main Case order-13.pdf 2022-04-22 (same-day ROP is order-14.pdf — use order-13). Auto DATE-CHECK cites 2018-01-16 HC / 1999-10-10 FIR dates — DATE-CHECK VERIFY: those are fact dates inside the named Krishna Murari + Ramana CJI + Hima Kohli reportable 22 Apr 2022. Isolate: once s.324 IPC hurt-by-firearm is proved, the accused cannot escape Arms Act s.27 punishment for using arms. Conviction under s.27 confirmed. Map 27 only — do not pad IPC 324 (already filled).
On this section: Arms Act s.27: once hurt by a firearm under IPC 324 is proved, the accused cannot escape punishment for using arms; non-recovery of the gun does not defeat s.27 where medical and eyewitness evidence establish firearm use (Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj / Seth).
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Manoj Singh vs The State of Bihar Thr. Secretary Home
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When multiple credible eyewitnesses consistently testify that the accused were present at the scene of occurrence armed with firearms and caused injuries to the victim, and medical evidence corroborates that injuries were caused by firearms, the conviction under Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons) and Section 27 of the Arms Act is sustainable despite minor contradictions in witness testimony regarding time of occurrence or specific injuries. Minor contradictions in material particulars do not discredit the entire testimony of truthful witnesses, and an alibi defense based on government service records cannot override consistent eyewitness testimony placing the accused at the scene.
On this section: Illegal possession and use of firearms - Conviction confirmed for both appellants; establishes liability for using arms in commission of offense
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Ashwani Kumar Saxena vs State of M. P
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a claim of juvenility is raised before any court, the court must conduct a simplified inquiry under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, following a strict hierarchical order of evidence: (1) Matriculation or equivalent certificates, (2) Date of birth certificate from school first attended (other than play school), (3) Birth certificate from corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat, or (4) Medical opinion only in the absence of the foregoing. Once any of the first three categories of documents is produced and not controverted, the court shall accept them as conclusive proof of age and pass a finding of juvenility if the age is below 18 years on the date of commission of the offence. The court shall not conduct investigative or trial-like inquiries, shall not require witnesses to be examined merely because they made entries in documents, shall not conduct medical tests unless the documents are found to be fabricated or manipulated, and shall complete the age determination within 30 days. A school admission register produced by the school principal is relevant and conclusive evidence of date of birth when consistently entered and not controverted, and courts shall not second-guess such entries by conducting fishing inquiries or requiring corroborating evidence such as horoscopes. The date relevant for determining juvenility is the date of commission of the alleged offence, and once established, the juvenile is entitled to all benefits under the Juvenile Justice Act regardless of when the claim is raised.
On this section: Applied to the charge of illegal possession of firearm used in commission of the crime.
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Sheikh Juman Etc vs State of Bihar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Members of an unlawful assembly share criminal liability for deaths caused by other members in furtherance of the common object of the assembly, even if they did not directly perpetrate the killing, provided they actively participated in the crime through facilitating acts such as preventing rescue efforts or demonstrating force with weapons, and this liability can be established through reliable eye-witness testimony corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and mere presence at the scene with knowledge of the common object is sufficient when combined with active facilitation.
On this section: Unlawful possession of firearms - Applied to convict some appellants for holding guns during the commission of the crime
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Ram Singh vs State of Rajasthan
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In cases involving unlawful assembly and large number of accused charged with joint offences causing multiple deaths and injuries, particularly where accused are co-villagers of witnesses: (1) Identification of accused can be established through naming in FIR, consistent testimony throughout trial, and absence of any challenge to identification at any stage, without requiring explicit identification claim in examination-in-chief; (2) Application of Section 149 IPC does not require separate role analysis for each member if it is shown that common object of unlawful assembly existed and the offence was committed in prosecution of that common object, with members aware of likelihood of such offence; (3) In such cases, the Masalti test requiring corroboration by minimum of two or three witnesses should be applied for sustaining conviction of individual accused to prevent wrongful inclusion of innocent bystanders; (4) Eyewitness testimony from interested/related witnesses can be credible if consistent with earliest version in FIR and supported by medical evidence, and absence of independent witnesses can be explained by fear in large-scale violence; (5) Absence of forensic evidence (pellet recovery, ballistic report) does not vitiate conviction when supported by cogent eyewitness testimony consistent with medical evidence of injuries; (6) Injuries on accused persons do not require prosecution explanation absent counter-version, self-defense plea, or proof that injuries occurred in same occurrence at same place.
On this section: Illegal possession and use of firearms; three accused (nos. 1, 2, 3) convicted for gun possession and use in commission of offence
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Constable 907 Surendra Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Mere presence of an accused in the same vehicle with the actual perpetrator of a crime is insufficient to establish common intention under Section 34 IPC. For conviction under Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds, preplanning, and shared common intention to commit the specific crime. The absence of such evidence cannot be cured by mere presence at the scene or in the same vehicle. An appellate court can only reverse an acquittal if the trial court judgment suffers from patent perversity, is based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or if only one conclusion of guilt is possible from the evidence on record.
On this section: Illegal possession and use of firearm - Applied to Head Constable Jagdish Singh for firing revolver without authorization
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Jalpat Rai vs State of Haryana
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When eyewitness testimony from interested parties with deep-rooted enmity comes into conflict with conclusive ballistic and medical forensic evidence, the eyewitness testimony cannot safely be acted upon to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, especially when the ocular account is internally inconsistent, suffers from significant discrepancies, omissions and improvements, and lacks independent corroboration from objective evidence. An appellate court cannot reverse an acquittal passed by trial court unless the conviction based on evidence is the only possible view, not merely a possible view. Conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, and where doubt exists about complicity, accused must be given benefit of doubt.
On this section: Punishment for using licensed firearm for unlawful purpose - separate offence chargeable against persons who misuse licensed weapons in commission of crime
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Satyavir Singh vs State of U. P
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
While a High Court possesses wide power to review evidence in appeals against acquittal and can interfere with the acquittal if it is perverse or wholly unsustainable in law, such interference should only be exercised when the acquittal is founded on surmises, conjectures, and unfounded assumptions unsupported by evidence on record, rather than on genuine doubts arising from the evidence itself. Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn from evidence, the appellate court should favour the accused. However, if the acquittal judgment proceeds on assumptions of facts not supported on record or adopts an approach contrary to the views a person of common prudence would take when direct evidence has been produced, the appellate court may justify interference. The principles of judicial caution do not permit an appellate court to refuse interference where guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt by credible eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and partly admitted facts, merely because a lower appellate court granted acquittal. The determination of intent for Section 307 IPC depends on the knowledge that the act may cause death, not on whether vital organs were targeted or death actually resulted.
On this section: Applied to conviction for use of firearm to commit an offence
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Mohmed Amin @ Amin C. R. M. Shaikh vs C. B. I Tr. Its Director
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When confessions are recorded by police officers of Superintendent of Police rank or above in accordance with Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules, 1987, such confessions are substantive evidence admissible against the maker as well as co-accused, abettors, or conspirators charged and tried in the same case. Even if an accused is acquitted of charges under the TADA Act, such confessions can be used for convicting him for offences under the Indian Penal Code or other enactments, provided the accused was tried jointly with TADA offences. The voluntary nature of confessions depends on the Court being satisfied that the requirements of Section 15 and Rule 15 were complied with, and when challenged by the accused, the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove such compliance. Once the prosecution discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the accused to prove through evidence that the confession was not made voluntarily or was not truthful. Confessions do not require independent corroboration for conviction of the maker, though as a matter of prudence, courts may seek general corroboration for use against co-accused unless satisfied of the confession's probative value. Mere retraction of confession is not sufficient to reject it; the crucial question is whether the accused was subjected to coercion, threat, or undue influence at the time of confession-making. Guidelines laid down in earlier judgments like Kartar Singh, while advisable, are not mandatory legal requirements unless incorporated into the statutory Act or Rules.
On this section: Appellants A-5 and A-8 convicted under Section 27 for illegal possession of revolver used in murder
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Pramod Kumar vs State(gnct) of Delhi
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Police officer witnesses cannot be automatically discredited solely on the ground that they are official witnesses. Their testimony must be evaluated on the same standards of veracity, credibility, and reliability as any other witness. If, after careful scrutiny of evidence, the court finds police testimony to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can act upon such testimony. The quality and strength of evidence is more important than the quantity of evidence or the source thereof. In the present case, the consistent testimony of multiple police witnesses, combined with ballistic evidence (FSL report on the country-made pistol, test fire results, matching cartridge evidence) and post-mortem findings (gunshot wound characteristics and direction), collectively and conclusively establishes that the accused (appellant) fired the fatal shot from the country-made pistol recovered from his custody, causing the death of Constable Maharaj Singh. The appellant's alternative defense that another police officer (Samar Singh) fired the fatal shot is rejected as lacking credibility and being contradicted by material evidence.
On this section: Use of firearm in commission of crime; applied for firing the country-made pistol resulting in death
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Sadhu Singh vs State of Punjab
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When an accused claims the right of private defence in a criminal matter, the burden is on the accused to establish, through careful examination of the entire incident in its proper setting, that circumstances gave rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The right of private defence commences as soon as reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit an offence and continues so long as the reasonable apprehension of danger persists. Once the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has been destroyed or put to rout, there is no further occasion to exercise the right of private defence. If the evidence shows that an accused exceeded the right of private defence, the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) rather than Section 302 IPC (murder), with the sentence determined to meet the ends of justice.
On this section: Offence related to unlicensed or improper possession and use of firearm - appellant was found guilty under this section for using a 12 bore SBBL gun
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Shivjee Singh vs State of Bihar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
To sustain conviction under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution must clearly prove that the accused shared a common object with the unlawful assembly, and the specific offence (such as murder) was either in direct prosecution of that common object or was known to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Mere membership in an unlawful assembly and participation in acts of violence (such as stone-pelting) are insufficient to fix constructive liability for a subsequent, distinct act of violence (such as firing) unless it can be proven that the accused entertained the common object of causing death or knew that death was likely to be caused. The temporal and factual separation between the stone-pelting and the shooting, combined with the absence of clear evidence that the common object extended to causing death, warranted the setting aside of the Section 302/149 conviction for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1494 of 2004.
On this section: Relates to unauthorized carrying and use of firearms; applied to Ambika Singh for firing the gun that caused death and injuries
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Sanichar Sahni vs State of Bihar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A person can be convicted of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC even if co-accused are not charged under the same section, provided: (a) there is credible evidence proving the accused conspired with others to commit an illegal act; (b) the accused was given fair notice and opportunity to defend against the conspiracy charge; (c) no actual prejudice resulting in failure of justice has been caused to the accused by any defect in charge framing; and (d) the conviction is supported by evidence led at trial. Defects in charge framing are not fatal to conviction unless the accused establishes real prejudice and demonstrates he did not receive a fair trial or understand the case against him.
On this section: Covers offences relating to arms. Applied to Munilal Sahni for unlawful possession or use of weapon in the murder.
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Karam Singh vs State Of Punjab
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In criminal cases involving non-compoundable offences such as Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder), while the conviction cannot be set aside merely on the basis of compromise between parties, the compromise is a relevant and significant circumstance that the court must consider when determining the quantum of sentence. When parties who are residents of the same village and apparently related have settled their disputes amicably after a prolonged period, the court should take a lenient view on sentencing to enable the parties to live cordially together, provided the conviction is maintained to uphold the rule of law. Additionally, acquittals recorded by the trial court should not be reversed on appeal at a belated stage when the evidence was insufficient at trial and the parties have subsequently reconciled.
On this section: Illegal Possession and Use of Firearms - Cited in FIR for use of firearms in commission of crime
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L. Deben Singh vs Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A cognizance order taken without prosecution sanction under Section 197 CrPC for an offence allegedly committed by a public servant in discharge of official duty is void ab initio and non-existent in law from its very inception. Consequently, when such void cognizance is set aside and the case is remanded for de novo committal process with proper compliance of legal requirements including obtaining prosecution sanction, the subsequent cognizance taken by the Sessions Judge after committal does not constitute double cognizance but is the first valid cognizance in the eyes of law. Therefore, the Sessions Judge's cognizance order dated 18.10.2019 is legally valid and does not violate the principle that cognizance can be taken only once.
On this section: Cognizance was taken under this section against Accused Nos. 2 to 8 for alleged use of firearms.
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Jangala Koteswara Rao at Koti vs The State of A.p.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash criminal proceedings becomes infructuous and is liable to be dismissed when the trial has already concluded and the matter is posted for judgment before the trial court, as the petition no longer serves any practical purpose at that stage of proceedings.
On this section: Charges related to illegal possession or use of arms
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Questions about Section 27
What have the courts held on Section 27 of the Arms Act?
Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh v. State of Bihar (22 Apr 2022) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below: Arms Act s.27: once hurt by a firearm under IPC 324 is proved, the accused cannot escape punishment for using arms; non-recovery of the gun does not defeat s.27 where medical and eyewitness evidence establish firearm use (Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj / Seth). Another 15 judgments on this section are set out below, 13 of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 2008 to 2025.
How do I find court cases under Section 27 of the Arms Act?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: Arms Act 27, section 27 Arms Act, section 27 of the Arms Act. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 16 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh v. State of Bihar (22 Apr 2022).
What should I read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, and has it changed?
Its own text turns on section 5 (Licence for manufacture, sale, etc., of arms and ammunition), section 7 (Prohibition of acquisition or possession, or of manufacture or sale of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition), so none of them can safely be read on its own. 1 other provision in this corpus refers back to it.
When did Section 27 of the Arms Act come into force?
Section 27 of the Arms Act, cited as Arms Act 27, came into force on 01 Oct 1962, having been enacted on 23 Dec 1959. It is in force as at the date shown on this page.
Other sections of this Act
- 25. Punishment for certain offences1755 words
- 2. Definitions and interpretation734 words
- 44. Power to make rules681 words
- 24A. Prohibition as to possession of notified arms in disturbed areas, etc618 words
- 17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences579 words
- 24B. Prohibition as to carrying of notified arms in or through public places in disturbed areas etc560 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Text as in force on 15 Oct 2026. This page is not a substitute for legal advice.