Power to suspend or remit sentences
Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 deals with power to suspend or remit sentences. When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sent The Act came into force on 01 Jul 2024.
(1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.
(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.
(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.
(5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with:
Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and---
(a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or
(b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.
(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Sanhita or of any other law, which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property.
(7) In this section and in section 474, the expression "appropriate Government" means,---
(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;
(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed.
Section 473, The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023).
Replaces a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
CRPC 432 Power to suspend or remit sentences Text carried over almost unchanged 99%
Measured by comparing the text of the two provisions, not taken from an official correspondence table — there is no machine-readable one. See both texts side by side before relying on it.
Both regimes are live. The repealed enactment still governs what happened while it was in force. We never redirect one to the other.
Cross-references
Extracted from the operative text of the enactments themselves. Every destination below exists in our corpus.
This section refers to
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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State of Haryana vs Naresh
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A Life Convict Has A Legal Right And Legitimate Expectation Grounded In The Constitution To Be Considered For Premature Release Under The Remission Policy Existing On The Date Of His Conviction, Not Under A Subsequently Introduced Stricter Policy. This Right Derives From: (A) Articles 20(1) And 21 Of The Constitution Which Protect Convicts Against Retroactive Stringency; (B) The Statutory Rules Under The Prisons Act, 1894 Which Create Vested Legal Rights; (C) The Constitutional Power Under Article 161 Which Operates As An Overarching Framework; (D) The Maru Ram Doctrine Which Establishes That Remission Policies Apply Prospectively And Rights Crystallize At The Time Of Conviction. Consequently, A Stricter Remission Policy Issued After A Convict's Sentence Cannot Be Applied Retroactively To Deprive Him Of The Benefit Of The Earlier, More Lenient Policy. The State Must Consider Such Convict's Case Under The Policy In Force At The Time Of His Conviction.
On this section: Empowers State Government To Suspend Or Remit Sentences; Court Held This Is Subject To Constitutional Power Under Articles 72/161
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State of Haryana vs Rajwanti
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict has a legitimate expectation to be considered for premature release based on the remission policy that was in force at the time of his conviction, not the stricter policy that may be introduced later. The State is required to exercise its power of remission while keeping in view the honest expectation perceived by the convict at the time of conviction that his case for premature release would be considered after serving the sentence prescribed in the remission policy existing on that date. Once a remission policy is issued by the government, it must be uniformly and invariably applied to all similarly situated convicts. A subsequent policy cannot be applied retroactively to make conditions more stringent for convicts already convicted under the earlier, more lenient policy. This principle applies even where the later policy is issued under statutory authority (Section 432 Cr.P.C.), as such statutory provisions are subordinate to constitutional clemency powers (Articles 72 and 161), which have always recognized the primacy of fairness and legitimate expectations in their exercise.
On this section: Section 432 empowers State Government to suspend or remit sentences; Section 433 enables commutation of sentences; Section 433-A imposes mandatory minimum imprisonment period of 14 years for specified serious offences; Section 401 relates to execution of sentences
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State of Haryana vs Pardeep
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict is entitled to have his case considered for remission and pre-mature release in accordance with the remission policy prevailing at the time of his conviction, and the State cannot retroactively apply a stricter remission policy to an already convicted prisoner. The relevant date for determining the applicable remission policy is the date of conviction, not the date of consideration of the case. The constitutional clemency power under Article 161 cannot be restricted by statutory provisions, but must be exercised in accordance with established policies and respect for the legitimate expectations of convicts developed at the time of their conviction.
On this section: Section 432(1) empowers State Government to suspend or remit sentences; Section 433-A imposes mandatory 14-year imprisonment restriction for certain capital offences; Section 401 relates to suspension of sentence. Court held that these statutory provisions cannot fetter the constitutional power under Articles 72/161.
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State of Haryana vs Surat Singh
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict sentenced under a remission policy in force at the time of his conviction retains the right to have his case considered for premature release in accordance with that policy, notwithstanding subsequent changes to the policy, unless the subsequent policy is more lenient. The constitutional power of clemency under Article 161 cannot be subordinated to statutory restrictions in Section 433-A Cr.P.C., and state authorities must exercise discretion in relation to the honest expectation perceived by the convict at the time of conviction that his case would be considered under the remission policy then prevailing. The State is obligated to at least exercise its discretion considering any benefit construed liberally in favour of a convict in relation to the policy applicable at the date of conviction.
On this section: Section 432 empowers State Government to suspend or remit sentences; Section 433-A imposes restrictions on remission for certain life imprisonment cases; these were central to the dispute regarding whether statutory restrictions override constitutional clemency
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State of Haryana vs Bhagwat Dayal
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a remission policy is in place at the date of a convict's conviction and is expressly referable to the constitutional clemency power under Article 161 of the Constitution, that policy constitutes the relevant legal framework for consideration of the convict's case for pre-mature release. A subsequent policy framed under statutory authority (Section 432 CrPC) cannot be applied retroactively to override the earlier policy, as constitutional power is superior to and paramount over statutory restrictions. The convict acquires a legitimate expectation that his case will be considered in accordance with the remission scheme applicable at the date of conviction, and this expectation is enforceable against arbitrary retroactive policy changes. The State's exercise of clemency power under Article 161 remains unfettered even by its own statutory policies, and must be guided by the principles of modern penology emphasizing rehabilitation, along with proper consideration of each case within the framework of the policy applicable at conviction.
On this section: Empowers state government to suspend or remit sentences of any person at any time; foundation for remission authority but limited by constitutional power
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State of Haryana vs Pirthi
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict has a legal right to have his case for pre-mature release considered under the remission policy or scheme existing on the date of his conviction, not the policy prevailing on the date when his case is considered for pre-mature release. This right is grounded in the Prisons Act 1894, constitutional safeguards under Articles 20(1) and 21, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation. When a remission policy is referable to the constitutional power under Article 161, it represents a constitutional mandate superior to statutory restrictions under Section 433-A CrPC, and cannot be retrospectively replaced by a stricter policy. The State must exercise its power of remission and clemency keeping in view the expectation crystallized in favor of the convict at the time of his conviction, and benefits should be construed liberally in favor of the convict.
On this section: Empowers State Government to suspend or remit sentences; Court held that this power is subordinate to constitutional power under Article 161
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State of Haryana vs Rajpal
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Where a life convict is sentenced under a remission policy that was prevailing on the date of his conviction, his case for pre-mature release must be considered in accordance with the policy existing on the date of conviction and not on the basis of a subsequently introduced stricter policy. This principle is grounded in: (a) the prospective-only application of Section 433-A Cr.P.C. as established in Maru Ram; (b) legitimate expectation doctrine protecting convicts based on policies applicable at conviction; (c) Articles 20(1) and 21 of the Constitution preventing retroactive application of harsher penal conditions; (d) the constitutional supremacy of Article 161 over statutory provisions under Section 432 Cr.P.C.; and (e) modern corrective theory of punishment emphasizing rehabilitation. However, the State retains the unfettered clemency power under Article 161 to exercise mercy even in cases not satisfying remission policy requirements, provided such exercise is not arbitrary, mala fide, or based on extraneous considerations. If a more lenient policy is introduced after conviction, convicts must be given the benefit thereof.
On this section: Section 432 empowers State Government to remit sentences; Section 433-A imposes mandatory 14-year minimum for heinous crimes but is prospective in effect; Court held these provisions do not fetter the constitutional clemency power
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State of Haryana vs Shamsher Singh
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict who was convicted and sentenced prior to the enactment of a stricter remission policy has a legitimate expectation and legal right to have his case for pre-mature release considered in accordance with the remission policy applicable at the time of his conviction, not a subsequently enacted, more stringent policy. The State Government is obligated to exercise its discretion to consider such cases honestly and uniformly under the earlier applicable policy. While the executive clemency power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution remains unfettered and can override statutory restrictions, this power must be exercised rationally, with reasons, and cannot be completely inflexible. Remission schemes referable to Article 161 of the Constitution constitute superior law and cannot be overridden by policies framed merely under Section 432 Cr.P.C. The Prisons Act, 1894 and statutory rules framed thereunder create enforceable legal rights in convicts, and these statutory rules must be uniformly and invariably applied once issued.
On this section: Empowers State Government to suspend or remit sentences at any time without conditions or upon conditions accepted by the sentenced person
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Duryodhan Rout vs State of Orissa
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a person is convicted of multiple offences at one trial, including one offence for which the sentence is life imprisonment, the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which limits aggregate imprisonment to 14 years, applies to prevent consecutive sentences. All sentences must run concurrently because life imprisonment means imprisonment for the entire remaining life of the convict, and the concept of consecutive sentences does not apply when one sentence is life imprisonment. The term 'imprisonment' in Section 31 CrPC includes life imprisonment as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and life imprisonment is not equivalent to 14 years or 20 years but means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convict's natural life unless remitted by the appropriate Government.
On this section: Power to suspend or remit sentences; cited regarding Government's discretion in life imprisonment cases
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Duryodhan Rout vs State of Orissa
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a person is convicted of multiple offences including one for which life imprisonment is the sentence, all sentences imposed under the Indian Penal Code must run concurrently rather than consecutively, because life imprisonment extends for the entire remaining span of the convicted person's natural life and is not confined to any definite period. The proviso to subsection (2) of Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which limits aggregate punishment to 14 years in cases of consecutive sentences, precludes the imposition of consecutive sentences when life imprisonment forms part of the conviction, as this would exceed the statutory limit. The term 'imprisonment' in Section 31 Cr.P.C includes life imprisonment, and life imprisonment means imprisonment for the full span of life unless commuted by the appropriate Government under Sections 55, 433, or 433A of Cr.P.C.
On this section: Remission of sentence by appropriate government; referenced to establish the procedure for remitting life sentences
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Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde vs State of Maharashtra
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When determining whether to impose death sentence or commute it to life imprisonment, courts must balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to both the crime and the criminal. Even in cases of heinous, planned murders of multiple victims, if mitigating circumstances exist—such as young age at time of commission (23-29 years), economically disadvantaged background, demonstrated capacity for reformation and education during prolonged custody (over 10 years), absence of prior criminal record, and absence of evidence that accused are beyond rehabilitation—the alternative option of life imprisonment is not unquestionably foreclosed. Therefore, death sentences can and should be commuted to life imprisonment in such cases. Life imprisonment is the rule; death sentence is the exception applicable only in the rarest of rare cases.
On this section: Remission provisions; Court clarified that any remissions granted to life convicts will be strictly subject to these sections
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Shamik Narain vs Union of India
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions by the President under Article 72 or Governor under Article 161, when spanning several years without plausible justification, violates the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution by inflicting psychological torture and dehumanizing effect on the condemned prisoner. Such delay constitutes a supervening circumstance warranting commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. The principle applies equally to all death convicts regardless of whether they are convicted under IPC or TADA. Limited judicial review of executive mercy decisions is available on grounds including non-application of mind, mala fide, arbitrariness, extraneous considerations, and failure to consider relevant materials. The Court, as custodian of fundamental rights, has duty to grant substantial relief for Article 21 violations rather than merely remanding matters to executive.
On this section: Power to suspend, remit or commute sentences; referenced in context of government's own rules for mercy petition disposal
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Shatrughan Chauhan vs Union of India
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in the disposal of mercy petitions filed under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution constitutes a violation of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, entitling a death row convict to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. The procedure for executing death sentences must be just, fair and reasonable, and prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions creates a dehumanizing effect equivalent to torture, making such execution constitutionally impermissible. While no fixed period of delay can be prescribed (overruling the two-year rule in Vatheeswaran), each case requires examination of the nature and extent of delay and all supervening circumstances (including mental illness developed on death row) in light of all the facts to determine whether execution should be carried out or commuted. The scope of limited judicial review of executive orders under Article 72/161 extends to examining whether the order was passed with application of mind, without mala fides, without extraneous considerations, with consideration of all relevant materials, and without arbitrariness. The gravity of the crime cannot preclude commutation based on delay as all death sentences are already for rarest of rare cases where gravity exhausts itself at sentencing. The distinction between TADA and IPC offences for mercy consideration is per incuriam and violates Article 14 (equality). Mental illness including schizophrenia developed by death row prisoners is a valid supervening circumstance warranting commutation. Solitary confinement of death row prisoners prior to rejection of mercy petition by President is unconstitutional.
On this section: Referenced in context of procedural rules; noted that petitions under these sections should be disposed expeditiously
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Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah vs State of Gujarat
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The appropriate government for the purpose of considering remission applications under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the state within which the offender is sentenced, not the state where the offence was committed or where the prisoner is currently incarcerated. When a trial takes place and sentence is passed in one state, that state's government is the appropriate government for remission purposes, regardless of where the prisoner is subsequently imprisoned.
On this section: Power to suspend or remit sentences; Section 432(7) specifically defines the appropriate government for remission purposes
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State vs Lalit Narain
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A reference under Section 432 Criminal Procedure Code can only be made when a case involves a question as to the validity of an Act or Ordinance, the determination of which is necessary for disposal of the case, and the court must be of opinion that such Act is invalid or inoperative but has not been so declared by the High Court or Supreme Court. The mere fact that an accused is mentally unfit to stand trial, lacks family support, or that care infrastructure is inadequate does not constitute grounds for reference under Section 432 CrPC. Instead, such situations must be dealt with under the comprehensive procedure provided in Sections 464-475 CrPC, which specifically address the trial of persons of unsound mind. Trial courts cannot invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 561-A CrPC or ask the High Court to exercise such powers; such powers are inherent to the High Court itself.
On this section: Court held that Section 432 strictly requires a case to involve a question as to the validity of an Act or Ordinance, the determination of which is necessary for disposal. The mere fact that an accused is mentally unfit does not trigger Section 432. The reference was rejected as not meeting the statutory requirements.
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State of Haryana vs Kiran Singh
Decided under Code of Criminal Procedure 432, which this section replaces. The court did not have this Act before it.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A Life Convict Sentenced Under A Particular Remission Policy Has A Legitimate Expectation To Be Considered For Premature Release Under That Policy Existing At The Time Of His Conviction. The State Cannot Retrospectively Apply A Subsequently Enacted Stricter Remission Policy To Such Convict. The Constitutional Clemency Power Of The Governor Under Article 161 Is Not Fettered By Procedural Statutory Provisions Like Sections 432, 433, 433-A Of The Criminal Procedure Code. The State Must Exercise Its Discretion In Relation To Such Legitimate Expectation Honestly And Cannot Ignore It. If A More Liberal Policy Is Subsequently Enacted, The Convict May Claim Benefit Thereof. Remission Policies And Rules Under The Prisons Act 1894 Are Guidelines That Must Be Uniformly Applied Once Issued, And The Governor Has Unfettered Power To Grant Clemency Even Beyond Their Terms In Appropriate Circumstances.
On this section: Section 432 Grants State Power To Suspend Or Remit Sentences; Section 433-A Restricts This Power In Case Of Death Sentence Commuted To Life Or Life Sentence For Capital Offences To Minimum 14 Years; Court Held These Are Subordinate To Constitutional Power Under Articles 72/161
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Judgments citing this section
These may be obiter dicta or a precedent, for you to study. These are the judgments where this section is quoted.
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… This was done keeping in mind the relevant directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 4 of 2021, titled In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, wherein all the States are directed to frame/modify their policies for grant of remission or additional remission under Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 or Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the same is therefore applicable to the case of the petitioner hererin, further submits the learned AAG. 21. Chapter XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is headlined as "Execution, Suspension, …
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… DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ..2.. 2025:KER:14471 J U D G M E N T The petitioner, who was convicted and sentenced under Sections 419, 468 and 471 of the IPC and Section 12(1)(d) of the Passport Act, filed a representation before the respondent seeking remission under Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'the BNSS'). This writ petition has been filed to give a direction to the respondent to consider and pass orders in the said representation within a time frame. 2. I have heard Sri.R.Anas Muhammed Shamnad, the learned counsel for the petitioner and …
Questions about Section 473
What have the courts held on Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita?
State of Haryana vs Naresh (22 Mar 2010) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below, though it was decided under CRPC 432, which this section replaced -- the court never mentioned this Act: Empowers State Government To Suspend Or Remit Sentences; Court Held This Is Subject To Constitutional Power Under Articles 72/161. Another 15 judgments on this section are set out below, 14 of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 2010 to 2019.
How do I find court cases under Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: BNSS 473, section 473 BNSS, section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 16 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with State of Haryana vs Naresh (22 Mar 2010).
What should I read with Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, and has it changed?
Its own text turns on section 474 (Power to commute sentence), so none of them can safely be read on its own. 3 other provisions in this corpus refer back to it. It carries forward CrPC 432 (Power to suspend or remit sentences), so the judgments decided under that provision are the case law on this one.
When did Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita come into force?
Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, cited as BNSS 473, came into force on 01 Jul 2024, having been enacted on 25 Dec 2023. It is in force as at the date shown on this page.
Other sections of this Act
- 359. Compounding of offences1355 words
- 187. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours1122 words
- 2. Definitions956 words
- 243. Trial for more than one offence930 words
- 35. When police may arrest without warrant881 words
- 480. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence823 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Text as in force on 14 Oct 2026. This page is not a substitute for legal advice.