Power to commute sentence
Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with power to commute sentence. The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute- (a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code; The Act came into force on 01 Apr 1974. Repealed by section 531 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023) with effect from 1 July 2024, but conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under it.
The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute-
(a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code;
(b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine ;
(c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or for fine ;
(d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine.
433A
Section 433, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974).
Now in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
BNSS 474 Power to commute sentence Text carried over almost unchanged 95%
Measured by comparing the text of the two provisions, not taken from an official correspondence table — there is no machine-readable one. See both texts side by side before relying on it.
Both regimes are live. The repealed enactment still governs what happened while it was in force. We never redirect one to the other.
Cross-references
Extracted from the operative text of the enactments themselves. Every destination below exists in our corpus.
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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State of Haryana vs Pirthi
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict has a legal right to have his case for pre-mature release considered under the remission policy or scheme existing on the date of his conviction, not the policy prevailing on the date when his case is considered for pre-mature release. This right is grounded in the Prisons Act 1894, constitutional safeguards under Articles 20(1) and 21, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation. When a remission policy is referable to the constitutional power under Article 161, it represents a constitutional mandate superior to statutory restrictions under Section 433-A CrPC, and cannot be retrospectively replaced by a stricter policy. The State must exercise its power of remission and clemency keeping in view the expectation crystallized in favor of the convict at the time of his conviction, and benefits should be construed liberally in favor of the convict.
On this section: Relates to commutation of sentence; discussed in context of constitutional clemency power
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State of Haryana vs Rajbir Singh
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a remission or short sentencing policy exists on the date of a life convict's conviction and is referable to Article 161 of the Constitution, that policy becomes the basis for evaluating the convict's case for pre-mature release. A subsequent, stricter policy issued after the conviction cannot be applied retroactively to override the convict's legitimate expectation of being considered under the policy prevailing at the time of conviction. The State has an obligation to at least exercise its discretion in relation to the honest expectation perceived by the convict at the time of his conviction. However, if a more lenient policy prevails at the date of consideration for remission, the convict should be afforded the benefit of that more favorable policy. While the convict has no absolute right to pre-mature release, he possesses a legal right to have his case considered in accordance with the relevant rules and policies. The constitutional clemency power under Articles 72 and 161 remains unfettered and superior to statutory restrictions under Section 433-A Cr.P.C., and can be exercised even before statutory minimum periods are completed in exceptional circumstances.
On this section: Relates to commutation of sentences; discussed in context of policy frameworks and constitutional clemency power
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State of Haryana vs Naresh
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A Life Convict Has A Legal Right And Legitimate Expectation Grounded In The Constitution To Be Considered For Premature Release Under The Remission Policy Existing On The Date Of His Conviction, Not Under A Subsequently Introduced Stricter Policy. This Right Derives From: (A) Articles 20(1) And 21 Of The Constitution Which Protect Convicts Against Retroactive Stringency; (B) The Statutory Rules Under The Prisons Act, 1894 Which Create Vested Legal Rights; (C) The Constitutional Power Under Article 161 Which Operates As An Overarching Framework; (D) The Maru Ram Doctrine Which Establishes That Remission Policies Apply Prospectively And Rights Crystallize At The Time Of Conviction. Consequently, A Stricter Remission Policy Issued After A Convict's Sentence Cannot Be Applied Retroactively To Deprive Him Of The Benefit Of The Earlier, More Lenient Policy. The State Must Consider Such Convict's Case Under The Policy In Force At The Time Of His Conviction.
On this section: Relates To Commutation Of Sentences; Court Held This Is Subordinate To Constitutional Clemency Power
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State of Haryana vs Bhagwat Dayal
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a remission policy is in place at the date of a convict's conviction and is expressly referable to the constitutional clemency power under Article 161 of the Constitution, that policy constitutes the relevant legal framework for consideration of the convict's case for pre-mature release. A subsequent policy framed under statutory authority (Section 432 CrPC) cannot be applied retroactively to override the earlier policy, as constitutional power is superior to and paramount over statutory restrictions. The convict acquires a legitimate expectation that his case will be considered in accordance with the remission scheme applicable at the date of conviction, and this expectation is enforceable against arbitrary retroactive policy changes. The State's exercise of clemency power under Article 161 remains unfettered even by its own statutory policies, and must be guided by the principles of modern penology emphasizing rehabilitation, along with proper consideration of each case within the framework of the policy applicable at conviction.
On this section: Related to remission power; cited to establish framework of executive mercy
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State of Haryana vs Shamsher Singh
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A life convict who was convicted and sentenced prior to the enactment of a stricter remission policy has a legitimate expectation and legal right to have his case for pre-mature release considered in accordance with the remission policy applicable at the time of his conviction, not a subsequently enacted, more stringent policy. The State Government is obligated to exercise its discretion to consider such cases honestly and uniformly under the earlier applicable policy. While the executive clemency power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution remains unfettered and can override statutory restrictions, this power must be exercised rationally, with reasons, and cannot be completely inflexible. Remission schemes referable to Article 161 of the Constitution constitute superior law and cannot be overridden by policies framed merely under Section 432 Cr.P.C. The Prisons Act, 1894 and statutory rules framed thereunder create enforceable legal rights in convicts, and these statutory rules must be uniformly and invariably applied once issued.
On this section: Provides framework for remission of sentences by executive authority
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Duryodhan Rout vs State of Orissa
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a person is convicted of multiple offences at one trial, including one offence for which the sentence is life imprisonment, the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which limits aggregate imprisonment to 14 years, applies to prevent consecutive sentences. All sentences must run concurrently because life imprisonment means imprisonment for the entire remaining life of the convict, and the concept of consecutive sentences does not apply when one sentence is life imprisonment. The term 'imprisonment' in Section 31 CrPC includes life imprisonment as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and life imprisonment is not equivalent to 14 years or 20 years but means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convict's natural life unless remitted by the appropriate Government.
On this section: Commutation of sentences; cited to show Government can commute life imprisonment for term not exceeding 14 years
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Duryodhan Rout vs State of Orissa
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a person is convicted of multiple offences including one for which life imprisonment is the sentence, all sentences imposed under the Indian Penal Code must run concurrently rather than consecutively, because life imprisonment extends for the entire remaining span of the convicted person's natural life and is not confined to any definite period. The proviso to subsection (2) of Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which limits aggregate punishment to 14 years in cases of consecutive sentences, precludes the imposition of consecutive sentences when life imprisonment forms part of the conviction, as this would exceed the statutory limit. The term 'imprisonment' in Section 31 Cr.P.C includes life imprisonment, and life imprisonment means imprisonment for the full span of life unless commuted by the appropriate Government under Sections 55, 433, or 433A of Cr.P.C.
On this section: Commutation and remission of life sentences; referenced to establish that only appropriate government can commute or remit life imprisonment, not after 14 years automatically
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Dadu @ Tulsidas vs State of Maharashtra
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Section 32A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is unconstitutional insofar as it takes away the power of the appellate court to suspend sentences awarded to convicts under the Act, because such complete prohibition renders the substantive right of appeal illusory and violates Article 21 of the Constitution. However, Section 32A remains valid insofar as it restricts the Executive's power to suspend, remit or commute sentences under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as this restriction is for a reasonable purpose of combating drug trafficking and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. A sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate court only and strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section 37 of the Act, which requires reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
On this section: Empowers the appropriate Government to commute sentences. Section 32A validly restricts this Executive power for NDPS offences.
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Saleem vs State of U.p.
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A death-sentenced prisoner has a constitutional right under Article 21 to legal aid in preparing and filing mercy petitions, and the State cannot proceed with a mercy petition filed by jail authorities without the prisoner's legal assistance and knowledge without violating procedural fairness and natural justice. The State must provide legal aid to the prisoner and reconsider the mercy petition in light of any additional material the prisoner wishes to submit with proper legal assistance, in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India.
On this section: Power of State Government to commute death sentence; remedy available to death-sentenced prisoners
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Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah vs State of Gujarat
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The appropriate government for the purpose of considering remission applications under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the state within which the offender is sentenced, not the state where the offence was committed or where the prisoner is currently incarcerated. When a trial takes place and sentence is passed in one state, that state's government is the appropriate government for remission purposes, regardless of where the prisoner is subsequently imprisoned.
On this section: Remission of sentence by appropriate government; the petitioner sought consideration under this section for remission of his life sentence after serving 14+ years
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Judgments citing this section
These may be obiter dicta or a precedent, for you to study. These are the judgments where this section is quoted.
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… remission in each case. -: 19 :- "Provided that where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 such persons shall not be considered for release from prison unless he has served at least fourteen years of imprisonment." The 1958 Rules also contained a provision to the effect that the sentence of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment shall be deemed to be a …
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… The decision in Jagdish (supra) , it is urged, mainly turned on the principle that the policy framed under Article 162 of the Constitution shall have overriding effect over the policy framed by the State in exercise of its powers under Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is urged that the conclusion arrived at in paragraph 42 of the judgment in Jagdish (supra) that the power exercised under Article 161 of Constitution is a mandate of the Constitution and therefore policy under Section 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C. cannot override the policy …
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… Vide the order dated 9-7-2014 [Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, 50 (footnote 5)] , we had restrained the State Governments from exercising their powers of remission and commutation of sentence under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to life convicts. The relevant paragraph of the order passed by this Court reads as under: "In the meanwhile, the State Governments are restrained from exercising their power of remission to life convicts." We had issued notice to all the State Governments through their …
Questions about Section 433
What have the courts held on Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
State of Haryana vs Pirthi (22 Mar 2010) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below: Relates to commutation of sentence; discussed in context of constitutional clemency power. Another 9 judgments on this section are set out below, 8 of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 2000 to 2020.
How do I find court cases under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: CRPC 433, section 433 CRPC, section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 10 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with State of Haryana vs Pirthi (22 Mar 2010).
What should I read with Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and has it changed?
4 other provisions in this corpus refer back to it. For anything done on or after 1 July 2024 the provision to read is BNSS 474 (Power to commute sentence), which replaced it; conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under this section.
When did Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure come into force?
Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cited as CRPC 433, came into force on 01 Apr 1974, having been enacted on 25 Jan 1974. It is no longer in force.
Other sections of this Act
- 320. Compounding of offences1554 words
- 167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours1005 words
- 220. Trial for more than one offence962 words
- 360. Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition804 words
- 2. Definitions799 words
- 198. Prosecution for offences against marriage774 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Recovered from the consolidated text published by India Code (item 330a1099-77ad-4a2e-b22a-769b33398f9e). This page is not a substitute for legal advice.