Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The Act came into force on 01 Sep 1872. Repealed by section 170 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023) with effect from 1 July 2024, but conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under it.
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustrations (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.
Section 106, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872).
Now in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
BSA 109 Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge Text carried over almost unchanged 100%
Measured by comparing the text of the two provisions, not taken from an official correspondence table — there is no machine-readable one. See both texts side by side before relying on it.
Both regimes are live. The repealed enactment still governs what happened while it was in force. We never redirect one to the other.
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Judgment of Main Case order-3.pdf 2006-10-11 DATE VERIFIED (not same-date ROP order-4). Crl A 1341/2005. Combined already maps this CNR to IEA 114 / BSA 119. This pass adds IEA 106: when a murder is committed inside the house, s.106 puts a corresponding burden on the inmates to explain; silence is an additional link. Do not re-map IPC 302 (already filled). Map iea 106 / bsa 109.
On this section: s.106: when a fact is especially within a person's knowledge, the burden of proving that fact is on him. A secret domestic killing puts a corresponding burden on the inmates to explain; silence or a false snake-bite story is an additional link (Trimukh). Combined already maps this CNR to IEA 114; this row is the 106 teaching.
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Rajinder Singh vs State of Haryana
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In dowry death prosecutions under Section 304B IPC, once the prosecution establishes that: (a) the victim died within 7 years of marriage under circumstances otherwise than normal, (b) the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand soon before death, the court must invoke the mandatory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act that the accused caused the dowry death. The 'soon before her death' requirement is satisfied when there is proximate connection between the harassment and death, determined on case-by-case basis. Circumstantial evidence, including conduct showing consciousness of guilt (such as hasty cremation), combined with forensic evidence and credible witness testimony, can establish dowry death beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to explain incriminating facts within special knowledge (such as presence of pesticide or hasty cremation) permits adverse inference under Section 106 of Evidence Act.
On this section: When fact is specially within knowledge of person, court may presume absence if not explained. Applied to burden on accused to explain presence of pesticide in vomiting of deceased.
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M. Vijayakumar vs The State of Tamil Nadu
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
To sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide, the prosecution must establish: (1) that the victim committed suicide, (2) that the accused abetted the commission of suicide through a positive act of instigation or aiding, (3) that the accused possessed clear mens rea (guilty mind) with the intention to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide, and (4) that there was an active or direct act by the accused that led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option. In the absence of evidence establishing these elements, particularly the mens rea and active act, conviction cannot be sustained. Furthermore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused unless the prosecution has first established a prima facie case.
On this section: Exception to burden of proof - applies when a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person. The Court held that this section cannot be used to shift the burden of proving the offence from prosecution to accused and can only apply after a prima facie case is established.
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Gian Chand vs State of Haryana
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Once possession of contraband articles is established in a drug trafficking case, the statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 operate against the accused, presuming conscious possession and knowledge of the contraband. The burden thereupon shifts to the accused to prove that he had no knowledge or conscious possession of the contraband. The absence of independent witnesses does not render police testimony unreliable if such testimony is found to be cogent, convincing, credible and reliable upon scrutiny. The failure to examine incriminating circumstances under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not vitiate the trial unless material prejudice to the accused is demonstrated. In cases of narcotics possession, the facts regarding how the contraband came to be in the vehicle fall within the special knowledge of the accused under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
On this section: Burden of proving facts specifically within knowledge of any person lies upon that person; applies to how accused came into possession of contraband
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Manickam @ Poonga Manickam vs The State Rep. by the Deputy Commissioner of Police
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The case resulted in divergent opinions. Justice V. Gopala Gowda's ratio: Accomplice evidence requires corroboration from independent sources in material particulars connecting accused with crime. One accomplice cannot corroborate another. When accomplice evidence is the sole link between accused and crime and lacks independent corroboration, conviction cannot be sustained. Acquittal under Section 120-B IPC precludes conviction under Section 109 IPC as the latter requires proof of overt act in pursuance of conspiracy. Justice Arun Mishra's ratio: Accomplice evidence can sustain conviction when corroborated by confessional statements, vehicle recoveries, and circumstantial evidence. Acquittal under Section 120-B does not affect conviction under Section 109 as these are separate offences with different ingredients. Presumption under Section 106 Evidence Act applies when abduction is proved and victim murdered soon thereafter.
On this section: Burden of proof in certain cases - applied to presume abductor is murderer when abduction proved and victim not seen alive thereafter
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Somasundaram @ Somu vs The State Rep. by the Deputy Commissioner of Police
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The case presents a divergent opinion on the reliability of accomplice evidence and the legal distinction between criminal conspiracy and abetment. Justice V. Gopala Gowda's ratio is that accomplice evidence requires independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime, and absent such corroboration, conviction cannot be sustained. Furthermore, acquittal under Section 120-B IPC is fatal to conviction under Section 109 IPC as the latter requires proof of specific overt acts in pursuance of conspiracy. Justice Arun Mishra's ratio is that accomplice evidence, when corroborated by multiple independent sources including eyewitness testimony, confessional statements, and recovery of articles, can sustain conviction even without formal designation as accomplice. Additionally, acquittal under Section 120-B does not affect conviction under Section 109 as these are separate offences with distinct ingredients, and the presumption under Section 106 Evidence Act applies when abductors cannot explain the fate of the abducted person.
On this section: Burden of proof regarding facts specially within knowledge of accused; applied to presume guilt of abductors
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Shankar Ganesh @ Shankar vs State Rep by the Dy Commisssioner of Police
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The case presents a split verdict with two divergent ratios: (1) Per Justice Gopala Gowda: Acquittal under Section 120-B IPC (criminal conspiracy) is fatal to conviction under Section 109 IPC (abetment by conspiracy) because the latter requires proof of conspiracy as a prerequisite. Accomplice evidence, even if corroborated, cannot sustain conviction when independent evidence fails to place accused at scene of crime or establish their specific role. (2) Per Justice Arun Mishra: Acquittal under Section 120-B does not affect conviction under Section 109 as these are separate and distinct offences with different ingredients. Accomplice evidence, when corroborated by multiple independent sources including confessions, recoveries, and circumstantial evidence, can sustain conviction. The presumption under Section 106 Evidence Act applies to abductors regarding victim's fate.
On this section: Burden of proof regarding facts within special knowledge; application to abductors regarding victim's fate
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Tata Industries Limited vs Cyrus Investments Pvt. LTD
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The removal of a Director from office, even if carried out in a manner that may be questioned on procedural grounds, cannot be termed as oppressive or prejudicial conduct under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, unless it is part of a larger design to oppress or prejudice the interests of some members. The invocation of the 'just and equitable' clause for winding up requires either a functional deadlock or an irretrievable breakdown of trust and confidence in a quasi-partnership relationship. The affirmative voting rights of Directors nominated by institutional shareholders holding majority stakes are valid and do not constitute oppressive conduct. The Tribunal cannot grant reliefs not sought by the petitioners or not permitted under law, including reinstatement of a director after the expiry of his tenure. The conversion of a company from public to private status is valid if the company satisfies the statutory criteria for being classified as a private company, and the Tribunal cannot interfere with such conversion on the ground of lack of probity without establishing actual oppressive or prejudicial conduct.
On this section: Burden of proof. The Court applied this section to hold that CPM was responsible for leaking his confidential email to the media.
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Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs Union of India Ministry of Finance through Secretary Revenue
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail (that Public Prosecutor be given opportunity to oppose and that Court be satisfied of reasonable grounds for believing accused not guilty and not likely to commit offence while on bail), is unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India because: (1) the classification based on sentencing of predicate offences has no rational nexus to the object of the PMLA Act which is to attach proceeds of crime and bring money laundering offenders to book; (2) the twin conditions relate to guilt of predicate offence, not money laundering offence, creating a disconnect; (3) the provision produces manifestly arbitrary results depending on whether predicate offence is in Part A or Part B of Schedule or whether person is charged with money laundering alone; (4) the provision inverts the presumption of innocence which is fundamental to criminal law; (5) the procedure is not fair, just and reasonable as required by Article 21; and (6) the provision lacks a compelling state interest justifying such drastic inroads into personal liberty.
On this section: Attorney General cited in relation to burden of proof in money laundering cases
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Buddhadeb Saha vs The State of West Bengal
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In a case of dowry death under Section 304B IPC, chemical examination of viscera is not mandatory. When a woman dies soon after marriage under suspicious circumstances following harassment for dowry, and there is evidence of unnatural death (such as post-mortem findings consistent with poisoning), the court can presume under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act that the person subjected to such harassment caused the dowry death. The absence of positive identification of poison in the viscera report is not fatal to the prosecution case if there is other evidence of unnatural death and the delay in forwarding samples can explain the negative report. Circumstantial evidence combined with the mandatory presumption under Section 113B can sustain a conviction for dowry death.
On this section: Burden of proof on person with special knowledge. Applied to place burden on appellants to prove that Tuli died under normal circumstances due to illness, which they failed to do.
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Paul vs The State of Kerala
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When an act amounts to culpable homicide and falls within any of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC, and the accused fails to establish that the case falls within any of the five exceptions enumerated in Section 300 IPC, the offence constitutes murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. The burden on the accused to prove exceptions is by preponderance of probability, but the prosecution burden to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt never shifts. An accused cannot escape the consequences of an act attracting the ingredients of murder by merely pointing to Section 304 IPC. The fact that a false case is set up by the accused does not deprive him of the right to establish that the case falls within exceptions to murder, but such exceptions must be supported by evidence on record. In cases of throttling resulting in death, the presence of injuries on the neck and other parts of the body, combined with the absence of credible explanation from the accused regarding what transpired in the privacy of the bedroom, establishes murder beyond reasonable doubt.
On this section: Burden of proof regarding facts within exclusive knowledge; court applied this to facts within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant regarding what transpired in the bedroom
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Vinod Solanki vs Union of India
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In quasi-criminal proceedings under FERA, a confession retracted before a Magistrate on the first available opportunity cannot form the sole basis for imposing penalty. The authority seeking to act on such a retracted confession must first apply its mind to the retraction, consider the circumstances in which it was made, reject it in writing with cogent reasons, and ensure that the inculpatory statement is substantially corroborated by independent and cogent evidence. The burden of proving that the confession was obtained voluntarily and free from threat, coercion, or inducement lies on the Department, not on the proceedee, and Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to FERA proceedings as they are quasi-criminal in nature. A mere retraction, without more, may not render a confession inadmissible, but the court and authorities are obligated to examine both the confession and retraction together and cannot ignore or conveniently bypass the retraction in the guise of applying burden on the accused.
On this section: Cited by respondent as basis for placing burden of proof on appellant based on special knowledge regarding foreign exchange transactions; Court rejected this argument, holding that special knowledge may alleviate burden on prosecution but does not shift initial burden entirely
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Tarsem Singh vs State of Punjab
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The essential ingredients of dowry death offense under Section 304B IPC, particularly the requirement that cruelty or harassment must be 'for or in connection with demand for dowry' and must occur 'soon before death,' are mandatory conditions that must be proved by the prosecution. A legal presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked unless the prosecution first proves all these essential ingredients, and specifically demonstrates that dowry was demanded temporally proximate to the death. Absence of evidence of dowry demand soon before death, notwithstanding proof of harassment or cruelty on other grounds, is fatal to prosecution under Section 304B IPC.
On this section: Court noted this section could have been invoked to place burden on accused in death case
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Md. Jeharul Ali vs The State of Assam
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
An appellate court will not re-appreciate evidence to find minor lacunas for the purpose of granting bail under Section 389 CrPC unless the conviction is patently illegal or perverse.
On this section: Burden of proving a fact especially within knowledge; applied to the 'last seen' company.
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Bomb Selvam @ Selvam vs The State of Tamil Nadu State Rep. by Deputy Commissioner of Police
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The ratio decidendi of the majority opinion (Justice V. Gopala Gowda) is that accomplice evidence, even if the witnesses are not formally designated as accomplices, must be corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence before an accused can be convicted. When the prosecution fails to provide such independent corroboration and the accused has been acquitted of the conspiracy charge, the conviction under abetment cannot be sustained. The burden is on the prosecution to establish the involvement of each accused individually in each offence charged, and mere presence at meetings or involvement in preparatory acts without direct evidence of participation in the crime is insufficient for conviction.
On this section: Burden of proof regarding facts specially within knowledge of accused; applied to presume guilt when abductor cannot explain fate of abductee
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Shankar Ganesh @ Shankar vs State Rep by the Dy Commisssioner of Police
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The case presents a split decision with no single ratio decidendi. Justice V. Gopala Gowda's ratio is that accomplice evidence requires independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime, and when such corroboration is absent and the accused are acquitted of conspiracy, conviction under abetment provisions cannot be sustained. Justice Arun Mishra's ratio is that accomplice evidence can be relied upon when sufficiently corroborated by confessional statements and recovery of articles, and acquittal under Section 120-B does not preclude conviction under Section 109 as these are separate offences with distinct legal requirements.
On this section: Burden of proof regarding facts specially within knowledge of accused; applied to abductors' knowledge of victim's disposal
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Questions about Section 106
What have the courts held on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act?
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (11 Oct 2006) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below: s.106: when a fact is especially within a person's knowledge, the burden of proving that fact is on him. A secret domestic killing puts a corresponding burden on the inmates to explain; silence or a false snake-bite story is an additional link (Trimukh). Combined already maps this CNR to IEA 114; this row is the 106 teaching. Another 15 judgments on this section are set out below, 15 of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 2006 to 2024.
How do I find court cases under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: IEA 106, section 106 IEA, section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 16 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (11 Oct 2006).
What should I read with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, and has it changed?
For anything done on or after 1 July 2024 the provision to read is BSA 109 (Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge), which replaced it; conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under this section.
When did Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act come into force?
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, cited as IEA 106, came into force on 01 Sep 1872, having been enacted on 15 Mar 1872. It is no longer in force.
Other sections of this Act
- 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant1207 words
- 14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body of bodily feeling1080 words
- 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement809 words
- 8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct773 words
- 65B. Admissibility of electronic records743 words
- 3. Interpretation-clause667 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Recovered from the consolidated text published by India Code (item e51341fa-7528-4327-9a57-5d194e16db6f). This page is not a substitute for legal advice.