Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes The Act came into force on 01 Sep 1872. Repealed by section 170 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (47 of 2023) with effect from 1 July 2024, but conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under it.
When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. [Explanation. ––“Offence” as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence.]2 Illustrations (a) A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said ––“B and I murdered C”. The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.
(b) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said –– “A and I murdered C”. This statement may not be taken into consideration by the Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried.
Section 30, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872).
Now in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
BSA 24 Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence Text carried over almost unchanged 95%
Measured by comparing the text of the two provisions, not taken from an official correspondence table — there is no machine-readable one. See both texts side by side before relying on it.
Both regimes are live. The repealed enactment still governs what happened while it was in force. We never redirect one to the other.
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Judgment of Main Case order-5.pdf 2002-09-03 DATE VERIFIED. Crl A 1114/2001. Kirpal CJI / Balakrishnan / Pasayat 3-judge (Bow Bazar bomb / TADA). Isolates IEA 30: a co-accused confession is not substantive evidence against another accused; it can only lend assurance if other evidence is independently credible. Map iea 30 + BSA 24 successor (near-identical 0.9164). Do not pad ipc 120B (already filled) or IEA 10.
On this section: IEA 30 does not make a co-accused confession substantive evidence; it may only assure other credible evidence (Mohd. Khalid).
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Mohmed Amin @ Amin C. R. M. Shaikh vs C. B. I Tr. Its Director
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When confessions are recorded by police officers of Superintendent of Police rank or above in accordance with Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules, 1987, such confessions are substantive evidence admissible against the maker as well as co-accused, abettors, or conspirators charged and tried in the same case. Even if an accused is acquitted of charges under the TADA Act, such confessions can be used for convicting him for offences under the Indian Penal Code or other enactments, provided the accused was tried jointly with TADA offences. The voluntary nature of confessions depends on the Court being satisfied that the requirements of Section 15 and Rule 15 were complied with, and when challenged by the accused, the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove such compliance. Once the prosecution discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the accused to prove through evidence that the confession was not made voluntarily or was not truthful. Confessions do not require independent corroboration for conviction of the maker, though as a matter of prudence, courts may seek general corroboration for use against co-accused unless satisfied of the confession's probative value. Mere retraction of confession is not sufficient to reject it; the crucial question is whether the accused was subjected to coercion, threat, or undue influence at the time of confession-making. Guidelines laid down in earlier judgments like Kartar Singh, while advisable, are not mandatory legal requirements unless incorporated into the statutory Act or Rules.
On this section: Excluded by non-obstante clause from TADA confessions; TADA confessions have different admissibility standard - not merely corroborative but substantive evidence
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State of U. P vs Sunil
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
In a criminal case based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances that is consistent only with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with any other hypothesis. Where the prosecution fails to establish an independent, credible connection between the accused and the incident alleged, the entire edifice of circumstantial evidence collapses, regardless of individual pieces of physical evidence. Adverse inference from refusal to provide fingerprints or similar evidence cannot serve as the sole or primary basis for conviction. The burden of proof throughout remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On this section: Admissibility of confessions made by one accused against another - The Court examined whether a co-accused's confession (Suresh Pal Singh's) could be used as substantive or corroborating evidence against Sunil.
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Rakesh Kumar Gudda vs Union Territory Of Jammu & Kashmir
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
At the stage of framing charges under Section 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court is only required to consider whether the material on record, taken on its face value, discloses the existence of all ingredients constituting the alleged offences. Even strong suspicion against the accused for commission of alleged offence is good enough to frame a charge. The court need not assess whether the evidence is sufficient for conviction. A confessional statement made by co-accused to police officer, though inadmissible against the person making it under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, does not vitiate the charge if other oral and circumstantial evidence, including motive, association, and recovery of weapon pursuant to disclosure statement under Section 27, prima facie establishes involvement of the accused. Bail on medical grounds should be granted where the accused is suffering from serious medical conditions resistant to treatment and the trial has progressed sufficiently to reduce risk of witness tampering.
On this section: Confessional statement of co-accused can be read against other accused; court found this inapplicable as primary confessional statement itself inadmissible
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Oinam Lukhoi Singh vs The State of Manipur
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
For an accused to be prosecuted under Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 for harboring a terrorist, there must be: (1) Knowledge that the person is a terrorist; (2) Intention to help the person evade apprehension; and (3) Actual harboring, concealment, or attempt to harbor or conceal. Merely giving a lift to an unknown person without knowledge of their terrorist connections and without any attempt to help them evade apprehension does not constitute the offense. Similarly, for Section 39 of UAPA to apply, the support must be within the meaning of clauses (a), (b), or (c) of Section 39(1) and must be done with the intention to further the activities of a terrorist organization. Confessional statements made to police without the presence of a Magistrate are inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot form the basis of prosecution. The confession of a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence against another accused unless the other evidence adduced by the prosecution is satisfactory and the co-accused's confession is used only as corroborative evidence. When no prima facie case is made out and the proceedings have been pending for an unreasonable period without progress, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR.
On this section: Provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by one affecting himself and others may be considered against such other persons. The court held that this provision did not protect the co-accused's confession as the petitioner and co-accused were not alleged to have committed the same offences.
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Aaftab Unnisa Begum vs State of Telangana
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
At the stage of framing charges or considering discharge applications, the court should consider the allegations on face value based on victim statements and prima facie material without conducting a roving enquiry. Confessional statements of co-accused, while not substantive evidence, can serve as corroborative material to establish prima facie case for continuation of trial. The court's power to amend or add charges under Section 216 CrPC after framing charges is valid and does not prejudice the accused's right to fair trial, provided Section 217 CrPC is complied with for recall of witnesses.
On this section: Confessional statement of co-accused relevant during joint trial but only as corroborative evidence, not substantive
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Judgments citing this section
These may be obiter dicta or a precedent, for you to study. These are the judgments where this section is quoted.
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… Act, one would prima facie tend to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that the confessional statement attributed to accused Munish Singh may not be proved against him or that the same cannot be proved against the co-accused named by him to be an accomplice in the commission of crime by the aid of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, as is rightly held by the trial court in the order impugned, that apart from confessional statement of accused Munish Singh dated 11.07.2020, which of course is contentious, there is other oral as well as circumstantial evidence which points to the prima facie involvement of …
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… and the deceased are one and the same; that the blood in blood-stained shirts (M.O.8, M.O.10, M.O.11) matches with the deceased's blood; that the prosecution proved the said fact through FSL Report namely chemical analysis (P.W.27) and Serology Report (Ex.P. 28); that the said Material Objects are admissible under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [henceforth referred to as 'Evidence Act' for the sake of brevity]; that the appellants did not deny or explain the said evidence while examination under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. In short, he submitted that the prosecution proved the arrest and recovery which connects the accused …
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… In view of the above undisputed evidence, the finding of the trial court with regard to Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act is arbitrary and is hereby set aside. 32. The finding of the trial court with regard to Sections 29 & 30 of the Indian Evidence Act is also perverse and arbitrary and the trial court itself after consideration of evidence of the parties in Para 40 of the judgment has given the finding that "In the light of above discussion, in my opinion, the desire of the respondent that the document is not binding on the respondent …
Questions about Section 30
What have the courts held on Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act?
Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (03 Sep 2002) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below: IEA 30 does not make a co-accused confession substantive evidence; it may only assure other credible evidence (Mohd. Khalid). Another 5 judgments on this section are set out below, 3 of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 2002 to 2025.
How do I find court cases under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: IEA 30, section 30 IEA, section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 6 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (03 Sep 2002).
What should I read with Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, and has it changed?
For anything done on or after 1 July 2024 the provision to read is BSA 24 (Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence), which replaced it; conduct before that date is still charged, tried and appealed under this section.
When did Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act come into force?
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, cited as IEA 30, came into force on 01 Sep 1872, having been enacted on 15 Mar 1872. It is no longer in force.
Other sections of this Act
- 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant1207 words
- 14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body of bodily feeling1080 words
- 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement809 words
- 8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct773 words
- 65B. Admissibility of electronic records743 words
- 3. Interpretation-clause667 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Recovered from the consolidated text published by India Code (item e51341fa-7528-4327-9a57-5d194e16db6f). This page is not a substitute for legal advice.