Effect of repeal
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal tak The Act came into force on 11 Mar 1897.
Where this Act, or any 1[Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not--
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.
Section 6, The General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897).
Cross-references
Extracted from the operative text of the enactments themselves. Every destination below exists in our corpus.
Referred to by 60
- Antiquities and Art Treasures Act s. 13 Power of Central Government to carry on the business of selling antiquities to the exclusion of others
- Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act s. 27 Repeal and savings
- Arms Act s. 46 Repeal of Act 11 of 1878
- Assam General Clauses Act s. 32
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Draft stage of translated version) s. 358
- Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam s. 43 Repeal and savings
- Bihar Value Added Tax Act s. 94 Repeal and savings
- Bills of Lading Act s. 6 Repeal and savings
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita s. 358 Repeal and savings
- Boilers Act s. 45 Repeal and savings
- Bureau of Indian Standards Act s. 43 Repeal and savings
- Carriage by Road Act s. 22 Repeal and saving
and 48 more
Related judgements & precedents
These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.
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Sushila N. Rungta v. Tax Recovery Officer
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Judgement order-44.pdf 2018-10-30 (Nariman & Sinha JJ.). Tool DATE-CHECK FP on 1970s fact dates — body is Sushila N. Rungta reportable. Repeal of Gold Control Act without savings: General Clauses Act s.6 does not apply where Objects/repealing scheme shows contrary intention; pending Gold Control proceedings abate. Map GCA 6. NEW act.
On this section: s.6 effect of repeal — does not apply where repeal/Objects show contrary intention (Gold Control abatement).
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Punjab National Bank vs Union of India Ministry of Finance/revenue Thr. Its Secretary
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
When a statutory rule is omitted from the statute books and replaced by a new rule that uses narrower language or does not provide for the same power, pending proceedings initiated under the omitted rule will lapse unless there is an applicable saving clause in the statute or the new rule. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies only to repeal of Central Acts or Regulations, not to omission of rules. Section 38A of the Central Excise Act does not save proceedings when the legislature manifestly does not intend to revive the power, as evidenced by the fact that the power is not re-introduced in subsequent rules and the language is narrowed from 'anything' to 'goods'. Therefore, confiscation orders passed under an omitted rule are without jurisdiction and void. Additionally, in the absence of a specific statutory provision providing first charge to the government, secured creditors under SARFAESI Act have priority over government debts, and SARFAESI Act provisions override all other laws including the Central Excise Act.
On this section: Provides for saving of rights and liabilities when a Central Act or Regulation is repealed; Court held this does not apply to omission of rules, only to repeal of Central Acts or Regulations
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G. Sekar vs Geetha
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The omission of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005 removes the statutory bar on female heirs' right to claim partition of dwelling houses in suits pending at the time of amendment. Although the amendment operates prospectively, its application to pending proceedings is permissible because Section 23 is merely a disabling provision restricting the right to partition by metes and bounds. A restriction imposed on a right cannot be equated with a vested right under Section 6 General Clauses Act. The absolute right of daughters to equal shares under Section 8 is not divested merely because the restriction in obtaining partition decree is removed by the amendment. Female heirs' statutory right to equal shares (1/5th each) devolved upon them upon the intestate death of the father in 1996 by operation of statute and cannot be taken away. The Parliament intended to achieve removal of discrimination not only in coparcenary property rights but also in self-acquired property partition rights of dwelling houses.
On this section: Application to repeal and omission of statutory provisions - whether it saves vested rights or applies to disabling provisions
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State of Punjab vs Bhajan Kaur
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A statute is presumed to be prospective unless held to be retrospective, either expressly or by necessary implication. Where a right is created by an enactment, in the absence of a clear provision in the statute, it is not to be applied retrospectively. The statutory liability created under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (providing Rs. 15,000 no-fault liability) was the right applicable when the cause of action arose for an accident occurring in 1983. The Motor Vehicles Act 1988, which came into force on 1 July 1989 and increased no-fault liability to Rs. 25,000 (and later to Rs. 50,000 in 1994), does not have retrospective effect as it contains no express or necessary implication of retrospective application. Rights and liabilities of parties are determined by the law in force when the cause of action arose, not by later legislation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 saves existing rights under the repealed statute but does not create new rights, and therefore applies to protect the claimant's right to the Rs. 15,000 compensation under the 1939 Act rather than extending the enhanced compensation of the 1988 Act.
On this section: Effect of repeal; Court held that it saves existing rights and liabilities accrued under repealed Act, does not create new rights, and therefore the old Act applies to pre-repeal transactions
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Nar Bahadur Bhandari vs State of Sikkim
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has competence to try offences committed under the repealed Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This competence arises from Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988, which creates a legal fiction deeming anything done or any action taken under the Act of 1947 to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1988. Section 30(2) expresses a different intention within the meaning of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and therefore the Special Court constituted under the Act of 1988 can take cognizance of and try offences under the Act of 1947.
On this section: Section 6 provides that repeal of an enactment does not affect the previous operation of that enactment or proceedings thereunder, unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act. The Court held that Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988 expresses such a different intention.
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Tata Industries Limited vs Cyrus Investments Pvt. LTD
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The removal of a Director from office, even if carried out in a manner that may be questioned on procedural grounds, cannot be termed as oppressive or prejudicial conduct under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, unless it is part of a larger design to oppress or prejudice the interests of some members. The invocation of the 'just and equitable' clause for winding up requires either a functional deadlock or an irretrievable breakdown of trust and confidence in a quasi-partnership relationship. The affirmative voting rights of Directors nominated by institutional shareholders holding majority stakes are valid and do not constitute oppressive conduct. The Tribunal cannot grant reliefs not sought by the petitioners or not permitted under law, including reinstatement of a director after the expiry of his tenure. The conversion of a company from public to private status is valid if the company satisfies the statutory criteria for being classified as a private company, and the Tribunal cannot interfere with such conversion on the ground of lack of probity without establishing actual oppressive or prejudicial conduct.
On this section: Effect of repeal. The Court used this section to determine the applicability of the new definition of 'private company' under the 2013 Act.
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Krishna Kumar Singh vs State of Bihar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The fundamental constitutional requirement that an ordinance promulgated under Article 213 must be laid before the State Legislature is mandatory and not merely directory. Failure to comply with this constitutional obligation constitutes a fraud on the constitutional power and render the ordinance without legal consequences. An ordinance cannot create enduring or irreversible rights that survive its expiration, as such a doctrine would subordinate the supremacy of the elected legislature to executive ordinance-making power. The express distinction in the Constitution between expressions 'cease to operate' and 'void' indicates that an ordinance ceasing to operate is not retroactively invalidated but ceases prospectively; however, an ordinance not placed before the legislature at all never acquires the constitutional fiction of having the force and effect of law. Re-promulgation of ordinances after their expiration without legislative conversion into law is unconstitutional and a fraud on the Constitution. The test for determining whether effects of an expired ordinance survive is the test of public interest and constitutional necessity, with the court retaining discretion to mould relief.
On this section: Applies to repeal of legislation and preservation of rights and liabilities; distinguished from cessation of ordinance which is different from repeal
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M/s Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs V.B.R. Menon
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
The National Green Tribunal has the jurisdiction and power to direct the Central Pollution Control Board and State Pollution Control Boards to exercise their powers under Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 for environmental protection. However, such directions must be reasonable, proportionate to the environmental objective, and not legislative in nature. When comprehensive guidelines addressing environmental concerns are already in place and operational, the NGT cannot impose additional mandatory approval mechanisms (such as Consent to Establish and Consent to Operate) as a supervisory measure, as this would be disproportionate and cause unnecessary hardship. Instead, the appropriate remedy is strict adherence to existing guidelines combined with enforcement action against violators. The exercise of NGT's wide discretionary powers under Rule 24 of NGT Rules must respect the deliberative decisions of regulatory authorities such as CPCB's industrial classification scheme and balance environmental protection with practical feasibility.
On this section: Cited in context of repeal provisions of NGT Act Section 38(8), dealing with implied repeal and succession of repealed legislation.
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Lic of India vs Insure Policy Plus Services Pvt. LTD
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Section 38 of the Insurance Act 1938 is a mandatory substantive provision that grants absolute rights to assign life insurance policies. Once an assignment is effected in compliance with the prescribed procedure (endorsement or separate instrument signed by assignor and attested by witness, with notice delivered to insurer), the insurer is bound to accept and record the transfer. An insurer cannot refuse valid assignments through administrative circulars or policy decisions, as such refusal would exceed delegated powers and violate the statutory mandate. Life insurance policies are transferable property and actionable claims within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, not mere social security measures precluding assignment. The requirement of insurable interest applies only at the inception of the policy, not at the time of subsequent assignment or transfer.
On this section: Cited by respondents to argue protection of existing rights under this transitional provision.
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Securities and Exchange Board of India vs S. K. Shelgikar
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Where a special statute expressly or by necessary implication divests lower courts of jurisdiction and vests it in higher courts through amendment, such amendment operates retrospectively to all pending matters, including those where offences were committed before the amendment and proceedings initiated before the amendment, unless the amendment itself expressly provides otherwise. The change of forum in such cases is not merely procedural but is mandated by express statutory language, and no person has a vested right to be tried by a particular forum once proceedings have been initiated. The legislative intent for retrospective application can be inferred from express language divesting jurisdiction from lower courts and vesting it exclusively in higher courts, as evidenced by phrases such as 'No court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try any offence' and 'all offences committed prior to or after the date of commencement shall be tried by Special Court.'
On this section: Applied to hold that pending proceedings are saved unless amendment expressly or by necessary implication indicates otherwise; here amendment expressly divests lower courts of jurisdiction
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Vasant Arjunrao Bhandak vs State of Karnataka
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
A notification issued under Section 26 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 appointing a Special Judge for a specified area to try offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 shall be deemed to be a valid appointment of a Special Judge under Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for that area, and such appointment extends to all cases under the 1988 Act, not merely to cases pending at the time of commencement of the 1988 Act. The deeming fiction created by Section 26 read with Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act operates to validate old appointments for new cases without requiring fresh notifications.
On this section: General repeal and saving provision; Court extensively discussed how Section 30(2) of 1988 Act modifies this provision through deeming fiction
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State of Punjab vs Harnek Singh
Court's Decision & Legal Precedent
Where a penal statute is repealed and re-enacted with similar or expanded provisions dealing with the same subject matter, and the saving provision in the re-enacting statute refers to the General Clauses Act, Section 24 of the General Clauses Act (which applies to repealed and re-enacted Acts) continues to apply unless explicitly excluded. Accordingly, notifications, orders, and administrative authorizations issued under the repealed statute continue in force under the re-enacted statute if not inconsistent with its provisions, and such notifications are deemed to have been issued under the re-enacted statute unless formally superseded or withdrawn. This applies through the legal fiction created by the saving clause that the new Act was in force when the old actions were taken.
On this section: Effect of repeal clause. Court held that Section 6(b) saves the previous operation of repealed enactments and things duly done thereunder. Referenced in Section 30(2) of 1988 Act to preserve rights and liabilities under repealed Act.
The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.
Judgments citing this section
These may be obiter dicta or a precedent, for you to study. These are the judgments where this section is quoted.
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… It may be if by this deeming provision a new offence was created, then the prohibition under Article 20(1) may come into operation. But in this case, as already pointed out, what is done is no more than reiterating the effect of Section 6(1) of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Garg, the learned Counsel, submitted that by amending procedure drastically and giving it retrospective effect, a new offence may be created retrospectively. It was contended that by shifting the burden of proof as provided for in Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, …
Questions about Section 6
What have the courts held on Section 6 of the General Clauses Act?
Sushila N. Rungta v. Tax Recovery Officer (30 Oct 2018) is the leading judgment on this section among those set out below: s.6 effect of repeal — does not apply where repeal/Objects show contrary intention (Gold Control abatement). Another 11 judgments on this section are set out below, all of them from the Supreme Court. They run from 1998 to 2023.
How do I find court cases under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act?
In judgments and charge sheets this section is written several ways, and each form finds a different set of orders. These search the full text of every order eCourtsIndia holds, best matches first: General Clauses Act 6, section 6 General Clauses Act, section 6 of the General Clauses Act. People searching for it also type general clauses act section 6a and general clauses act 1897 section 6. Each opens the full list of orders on eCourtsIndia, where it can be narrowed by court, year and outcome. 12 reported judgments on this section are set out on this page, beginning with Sushila N. Rungta v. Tax Recovery Officer (30 Oct 2018).
What should I read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, and has it changed?
60 other provisions in this corpus refer back to it.
When did Section 6 of the General Clauses Act come into force?
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, cited as General Clauses Act 6, came into force on 11 Mar 1897, having been enacted on 11 Mar 1897. It is in force as at the date shown on this page.
Other sections of this Act
- 3. Definitions2735 words
- 23. Provisions applicable to making of rules or bye-laws after previous publication243 words
- 24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments repealed and re-enacted178 words
- 4. Application of foregoing definitions to previous enactments143 words
- 28. Citation of enactments143 words
- 10. Computation of time139 words
Source and method. Compiled from the enactments of Parliament and of the State legislatures as published on India Code, and republished together with commentary and other original matter under section 52(1)(q)(ii) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Structured, cross-referenced and maintained by eCourtsIndia. Text as in force on 14 Oct 2026. This page is not a substitute for legal advice.