Punishment for murder by life-convict

Related judgements & precedents

These are some judgments that construed this section, and hold precedence value. They hold authority on how to read, interpret and use this section.

1. Shamik Narain vs Union of India

   Supreme Court of India 21 Jan 2014 Binding (Supreme Court Bench Decision) with Constitutional Implications Reportable 2014 (1) SCALE 1 / (2014) 1 SCC 1 / AIR 2014 SC 1

   Court's Decision & Legal Precedent

   Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions by the President under Article 72 or Governor under Article 161, when spanning several years without plausible justification, violates the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution by inflicting psychological torture and dehumanizing effect on the condemned prisoner. Such delay constitutes a supervening circumstance warranting commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. The principle applies equally to all death convicts regardless of whether they are convicted under IPC or TADA. Limited judicial review of executive mercy decisions is available on grounds including non-application of mind, mala fide, arbitrariness, extraneous considerations, and failure to consider relevant materials. The Court, as custodian of fundamental rights, has duty to grant substantial relief for Article 21 violations rather than merely remanding matters to executive.

   On this section: Mandatory death sentence for murder by life convict; struck down by Constitution Bench in Mithu as unconstitutional for excluding judicial discretion

   Read the full order on eCourts India

2. Shatrughan Chauhan vs Union of India

   Supreme Court of India 21 Jan 2014 Binding (Supreme Court precedent on constitutional matters; three-Judge Bench de Reportable Reported as Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 1 (or similar citation in SCC 2014)

   Court's Decision & Legal Precedent

   Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in the disposal of mercy petitions filed under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution constitutes a violation of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, entitling a death row convict to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. The procedure for executing death sentences must be just, fair and reasonable, and prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions creates a dehumanizing effect equivalent to torture, making such execution constitutionally impermissible. While no fixed period of delay can be prescribed (overruling the two-year rule in Vatheeswaran), each case requires examination of the nature and extent of delay and all supervening circumstances (including mental illness developed on death row) in light of all the facts to determine whether execution should be carried out or commuted. The scope of limited judicial review of executive orders under Article 72/161 extends to examining whether the order was passed with application of mind, without mala fides, without extraneous considerations, with consideration of all relevant materials, and without arbitrariness. The gravity of the crime cannot preclude commutation based on delay as all death sentences are already for rarest of rare cases where gravity exhausts itself at sentencing. The distinction between TADA and IPC offences for mercy consideration is per incuriam and violates Article 14 (equality). Mental illness including schizophrenia developed by death row prisoners is a valid supervening circumstance warranting commutation. Solitary confinement of death row prisoners prior to rejection of mercy petition by President is unconstitutional.

   On this section: Discussed as an example of unconstitutional provision (struck down in Mithu); used as analogy to argue against mandatory death sentences without discretion

   Read the full order on eCourts India

3. Dinesh Singh vs State of U. P

   Supreme Court of India 04 Aug 2008 Binding (SC) - High Precedential Value Reportable

   Court's Decision & Legal Precedent

   Where an accused claims the right of private defence, he must establish on the basis of preponderance of probabilities that there existed reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt at the time of the alleged defensive action. The right of private defence is a legitimate right available only when circumstances clearly justify it, requiring careful examination of the entire incident in its proper setting. Where no person on the prosecution side is shown to be armed with any weapon, there cannot be any reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt, and therefore the right cannot extend to causing death. The burden rests on the accused to establish this right, and absent such establishment, an act causing death constitutes culpable homicide.

   On this section: Implied reference in context of alternative conviction

   Read the full order on eCourts India

The holding above is the ratio decidendi as extracted from the judgment by eCourts India, reproduced unaltered — it is a rendering of the court's reasoning, not a substitute for its words. Read the order itself before relying on it.